Hybrid Conflicts: How Russia is employing unconventional means to hinder the West

• The Ukrainian armed forces’ invasion of Russia’s Kursk Oblast, while raising morale, has also raised concerns among political pundits that this incident could spark an uptick in Moscow’s unconventional warfare in the West to inhibit their support of Ukraine. The Russian state has historically employed a wide array of unconventional means to combat Western nations, most notably by sowing unrest via misinformation campaigns and division in Western societies.

• The most impactful of these unconventional warfare methods is Moscow’s increasing utilisation of GNSS spoofing and jamming campaigns in the Black and Baltic Seas and surveillance in the North Sea. Such GNSS spoofing can prove particularly dangerous for maritime and aviation firms in the Black and Baltic Seas during times of low visibility when the use of GNSS is critical. There is a heightened risk of such activity leading to accidents, personnel injury, or even death in the worst-case scenario. Meanwhile, the increasing surveillance of critical North Sea infrastructure by Russian individuals or Russian state-associated entities and the lack of clear roles and responsibilities among asset stakeholders expose the degree of vulnerability for critical European infrastructure.

• Lastly, there is a significant risk of Moscow employing its expanding presence on the African continent to cause socio-economic and political unrest that leads to migrants entering the EU and sow further division. Moreover, the rise of right-wing figures similar to that of Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán will exacerbate the decision-making processes of the EU, provide Russian disruption operations easier access to Continental Europe, and sow disunity throughout the bloc. Such a dis-unified EU will prove beneficial for Moscow as it seeks to continue its disruptive, unconventional methods against Western nations to hinder their support for Ukraine.

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On 6 August, the Ukrainian armed forces invaded Russia’s Kursk Oblast, bringing the war into Russian territory for the first time during this conflict. This Ukrainian incursion has raised morale amongst Ukrainian citizens and soldiers regarding Kyiv’s ability to achieve strategic victories in the conflict despite several military setbacks in recent months. However, this incursion has also raised concerns amongst Western political pundits that this incident could increase Moscow’s utilisation of unconventional warfare in the West to inhibit their support of Ukraine and decrease Kyiv’s ability to launch further such incursions into Russian territory.

What is unconventional warfare?

Unconventional warfare can be understood as methods employed by an adversary to realise a desired, detrimental effect on a target population. It is usually employed by belligerents who are inferior to their opponent in one or more conventional markers, usually military size and capability. Such is the case between Russia and the EU and its allies, such as the US. ‘Unconventional warfare’, ‘operating in the grey zone’, and ‘hybrid warfare’ are methods that have been used since the dawn of time and are often used synonymously, albeit with nuanced differences.

Nowadays, the Russian state is waging an unconventional war against Western nations by employing various impactful and, most importantly, deniable means to counter the West whilst operating under the threshold that constitutes interstate war. The Russian state conducts its hybrid war with efforts that seek to shape the political and strategic echelons of adversaries to its preference, especially with regard to the West’s support of Ukraine. Nowadays, such preferential outcomes are sought using several unconventional means.

The Next Generation of Unconventional Warfare

Recent online mis- and disinformation operations

One of the most frequently employed unconventional means by which Russia tries to realise its aims is conducting misinformation and disinformation campaigns via cyberspace. These unconventional means offer plausible deniability while having a massive effect on its often Western, liberal target population. The whole idea of conducting such operations is that they offer plausible deniability when confronted with allegations, which will usually prevent any escalation in the matter due to the lack of solid evidence.

Often, misinformation and disinformation campaigns exacerbate already-present societal divisions or introduce doubt. Therein lies the essence of such unconventional means: influencing a target population. Disinformation can shape Western populations’ views on current events and polarise opinions that could eventually disrupt effective governance. Importantly, these operations are conducted below the thresholds of interstate war.

Recent notable examples of disinformation operations that are associated with the Russian state:

1.     The proliferation of pro-Russian accounts reposted and commented on contentious topics in European nations.

2.     Russian embassies in Latin America disseminated Spanish-language claims that the war in Ukraine was against Western imperialism.

3.     Numerous operations were run by the Internet Research Agency, including #ebolainatlanta.

4.     Allegations that Ukraine is run by a Neo-Nazi regime

5.     Allegations that NATO countries are operating chemical weapon laboratories in Ukraine.

6.     Russians are being systematically discriminated against in the West.

7.     Fear-mongering as to the impact that immigration has on the security of the USA.

Russian GNSS Spoofing Threatens the Maritime and Aviation Industries

Besides mis/disinformation, Moscow also utilises its technical capabilities to disrupt business operations in Russia’s near-abroad area, notably affecting the Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) in the Black Sea region. Two notable recent examples of such operations were seen on 8 March 2024, in the vicinity of the Crimean Peninsula and the second on April in the Kerch Strait. March saw hundreds of vessels’ Automated Identification System (AIS) locations place vessels in the vicinity of Moscow, whereas 50 vessels believed to be in the vicinity of the Kerch Strait were geolocated via their AIS beacons on the tarmac of Simferopol International Aiport (Crimea) and Gelendzhik Airport (Krasnodar Krai, Russia).

Such operations facilitate the Russian state's sanctions evasion measures while endangering all those who transit one of the world’s busiest shipping lanes. Such GNSS spoofing can prove particularly dangerous for shipping firms sailing through the Black Sea during times of low visibility when the use of GNSS is critical. In such a scenario, vessels sailing through areas impacted by GNSS spoofing are at a heightened risk of sailing into oncoming vessels, resulting in potential financially costly collisions, personnel injury, or even death in the worst-case scenario.

Similar GNSS spoofing concerns exist in other regions as well, particularly the Baltic Sea. Tens of thousands of planes transiting the Baltic region in 2024 were affected by GNSS jamming activity. Notably, as of 2 May, numerous airlines, such as British Airways (82), Wizz Air (1400), and Ryanair (2300), reported disruptions in the region. Furthermore, two events occurred on 25 and 26 April 2024, where civilian aircraft were forced to return to Finland as they could no longer navigate safely in the region due to interference. Such GNSS interference has long plagued the region but has received renewed attention since February 2022 when Russia invaded Ukraine.

Since the Baltic Sea became a NATO lake following Sweden and Finland's ascension to the alliance, there have been apparent renewed unconventional efforts, likely by Russian state-associated entities, to disrupt navigational efforts in the region. As a result, the foreign ministers of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia all claimed that events had increased since late April. With tensions over these countries’ ascensions unlikely to desist for the foreseeable future, there is a heightened risk of GNSS spoofing and disruptions. This will present a persistent and significant risk to business operations – such as maritime or aviation firms – active around the Baltic Sea.

Increased surveillance of North Sea infrastructure

Elsewhere, the North Sea is strategically important for its littoral states and NATO and has been intensely surveilled by the Russian state since the 1960s. However, since 2014, the area has received renewed attention from Moscow, not least because of the critical infrastructural vulnerabilities in this area for European nations.

Not only have Russian engineers been found to be operating as engineers to critical of shore infrastructure in the North Sea, but infrastructure has become increasingly surveilled by Russian-associated maritime entities in zones where security responses are limited at best. Most notably, gas pipelines that transport significant amounts of nations’ gas supplies, internet cables, and offshore renewable energy infrastructure crisscross the North Sea and are increasingly surveilled by Russian-associated entities.

In a recent case, a Russian submarine surfaced in neutral Ireland’s waters, only to be deterred by French, Norwegian, and British anti-submarine aerial assets. This exemplifies how Russian unconventional warfare draws those previously neutral nations in the East-West competition into the fray.

However, one of the greatest problems in the North Sea is that critical assets lie outside of national territorial water (>12Nm) and within the EEZ (<200Nm), an area where if a nation sees that there is suspicious activity taking place, the most they can do is ask the suspect politely to stop doing what they are doing. This inability to respond to unconventional means conducted by Europe’s adversaries means that our critical infrastructure is critically vulnerable to disruption or destruction, and as such, so are Europeans’ daily lives.

The Kremlin’s weaponisation of migration

A key unconventional tool employed by the Russian state in the past ten years has been its private military contracting (PMC) firms. These firms are illegal in Russia but are increasingly wielded internationally as a tool of the state. Wagner, handled by Russian Intelligence Chiefs, was first observed as an extension of the Kremlin during its operations in Syria (late 2015). Moscow supported the Assad regime as it afforded Russia access to Mediterranean ports. Still, in doing so, Russian forces, alongside Assad-aligned fighters, committed atrocities and caused mass migration of the population.

However, the civil war in Syria caused millions of Syrian refugees to seek asylum within EU nations in the following years, with 1,325,000 asylum seekers trying to do so in 2015. This great influx of people overwhelmed the peripheral nations’ infrastructure, such as Italy and Greece, and were ultimately unequally dispersed throughout EU member states. This destabilising effect on the EU's Southeastern nations could be replicated along the EU’s southern flank if Russia successfully gains military access to every Sahelian nation.

If Russia can further its influence in the aforementioned countries, it can solidify its control over Europe’s transcontinental energy and trade links on the African continent. The support of the Sahelian states ensures their support for Russia on UN resolutions, for example, in Syria or Ukraine. However, this also heightens the likelihood that large portions of those countries’ societies will flee to more secure places, such as Europe. Such a great influx of migrants entering the EU will overburden many nations’ infrastructure and cause unequal distribution. National populations may become anxious and fearful as to the impact a large migrant influx will have on their countries. It is, therefore, likely that populist and right politics will become more widespread, causing friction domestically and within the consensus-based EU. The likely rise of right-wing figures similar to that of Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán will exacerbate the decision-making processes of the EU, provide Russian disruption operations easier access to Continental Europe, and sow disunity throughout the bloc. Undoubtedly, such a dis-unified EU will prove beneficial for Moscow as it seeks to continue its disruptive, unconventional methods against Western nations to hinder their support for Ukraine.

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