Looking forward towards the US’ Indo-Pacific policy under a Potential Trump Presidency

• Beijing’s increasingly aggressive territorial claims in the Indo-Pacific have threatened freedom of navigation in the region and heightened operational risks faced by critical international businesses, such as those in the maritime and aviation sectors. While the US and its regional allies have launched several initiatives to ensure freedom of navigation through the region is unencumbered, there remains uncertainty about whether such initiatives will be maintained following the 2024 US Presidential election in November.
• US President Joe Biden’s withdrawal from the 2024 elections heightens the risk of former US President Donald Trump returning to the White House. Under Trump, the US began a strategic pivot away from the Indo-Pacific, calling critical allies such as Japan or South Korea “Free-riders”. A second Trump presidency will likely see a return of these policies and a reduction of the US military presence in the Indo-Pacific.
• However, a lessened US military presence would increase the likelihood of China ramping up its aggressive military tactics in the Indo-Pacific. Such a scenario would likely bring renewed global supply chain disruptions. In addition, higher operational costs, hiked insurance rates in light of the growing threats in the region, and the halt in the steady global economic recovery progress made since the COVID-19 pandemic.

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Beijing’s increasingly aggressive actions in the East China Sea, South China Sea, and around the Strait of Taiwan, have restricted freedom of navigation within these contested waters. This has raised both international and regional concerns that vital business operations– e.g. commercial shipping, commercial aviation, etc. – could be disrupted or delayed so significantly that it negatively impacts global economic output. In response, Western nations, most notably the US government, have increased their security posturing in the Indo-Pacific. The US remains a key linchpin in its regional allies’ – e.g. Japan and South Korea – counterbalance to China’s aggressions.

Washington has held several joint military drills with regional partners in the last year, including with Japan and South Korea near disputed islands in the East China Sea and with the Philippines and several other partners in the contested South China Sea. Such drills indicate the significant investment in the Indo-Pacific’s security under US President Joe Biden’s administration. Further to this, Biden has increased his efforts to expand military access to bases in allied nations across the region. Similarly, the US Congress allocated $8.1 billion in an April supplementary bill to counter China in the Indo-Pacific.

Washington will likely hold joint military drills throughout the coming year to ensure Freedom of Navigation through the Indo-Pacific. However, there remains a high uncertainty about whether such initiatives will be maintained on Washington’s policy agenda following the November 2024 presidential election. Former US President Donald Trump maintains a strong lead in the electoral polls following incumbent President Joe Biden’s withdrawal from the 2024 elections. This raises the possibility of a second Trump presidency despite the scandals linked to his legal disputes.

Under the initial Trump presidency, the US began a strategic pivot away from the Indo-Pacific. Most notably, Trump declared important regional allies such as Japan or South Korea as security “free-riders” and decreased the US military presence in the region. As such, Trump's return to the White House would increase the likelihood of Washington reducing its presence in strategically positioned countries. This includes South Korea or Japan’s Okinawa prefecture to help counter China’s growing influence in the region as a guise to reduce the burden on the US economy. Similarly, we are seeing countries such as Taiwan focus more on military independence following Trump’s comments that Taiwan should “pay us[the US] for defence|” because they allegedly “stole” the semiconductor industry. In response, Taiwanese Foreign Minister Ling Chia-lung stated that Taiwan will further increase its military spending – after approving a record-high budget in 2023 -  to counter the growing China threat.

China’s Increasingly Aggressive Behaviour in the Indo-Pacific

Already, there are reliable indications that Chinese President Xi Jinping strategically positions the Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) and other military assets to ramp up Beijing’s territorial claims in the region further in the lead-up to a potential Trump presidency. In the East China Sea, for instance, the Japanese Defence Ministry detected the CCG sailing around the Japan-controlled but Chinese-contested Pinnacle Islands – also known as Senkaku or Diaoyu Islands – for 158 consecutive days. Similarly, the CCG and the Philippines Coast Guard (PCG)have been engaged in an escalating tit-for-tat conflict in the South China Sea during the first half of 2024. Most notably, the CCG issued an order for its forces to “detain foreign nationals for up to 60 days starting 15 June” if they were “caught trespassing in what it considered Beijing’s territorial waters”. In response, Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. warned that the death of any Filipino citizen as a result of Chinese actions would be “very, very close” to constituting an act of war and that his office would respond “accordingly”. Non-military clashes between the two sides have already been observed since 15 June, with a Chinese vessel and a Philippine supply ship colliding near the disputed Spratly Islands.  

However, China’s increasing power projection can most notably be seen around the Strait of Taiwan. Chinese naval and aerial forces have launched daily incursions into Taiwan’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ). Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defence(MND) claimed that it tracked 247 and 176 military aircraft and naval vessels, respectively, throughout April 2024 alone. Similarly, Beijing launched a two-day maritime drill around Taiwan following Taiwan’s President Lai Ching-Te’s inauguration in May.

US Allies' Boltering Defence Policies

While regional players – such as Japan –continue to signal their intent to increase their military efforts to contain China’s aggressive and disruptive behaviour in the Indo-Pacific, much of these plans rely to some degree on the US security apparatus being active in the region. To compensate for this, these players – particularly Japan – have increased their strategic cooperation agreements and military drills with nation-states - such as the UK, Australia, and the Philippines - across the Indo-Pacific region. This non-US-focused defence cooperation is highly likely to increase further under a Trump presidency as these countries continue to shore up their security robustness against regional threats such as China or North Korea. However, without an active and abundant US military presence in the Indo-Pacific, threats such as China’s strategic goal of being able to invade Taiwan by 2027 become an evermore plausible reality despite its apparent setbacks.

While a democratic president is likely to maintain the US’ commitments to its security partners in the Indo-Pacific, the growing possibility of their electoral defeat in November heightens the risk of the second half of 2024being fraught with China-sparked geopolitical flashpoints that impact other countries as well. A potential foreshadowing of this would be the Dutch Ministry of Defence’s 7 June announcement that Chinese air force jets approached the Dutch HNLMS Frigate Tromp in a“potentially unsafe situation” in the East China Sea. These jets reportedly circled the Tromp several times as the ship conducted a UN maritime sanction enforcement mission against North Korea. The Chinese Ministry of Defence issued a follow-up warning that the Netherlands should “limit its sea and air activities in the East China Sea”.

This confrontation highlights Beijing’s late May warning that it would “halt any actions that could endanger Chinese sovereignty and national security under the guise of freedom of navigation” after the Tromp sailed through the Strait of Taiwan. On the surface, Beijing’s actions can be viewed as acts aimed at deterring Western activity against its regional ally, North Korea. However, these efforts could be more accurately described as China’s growing acts of power projection in the Indo-Pacific region in light of what it perceives as potentially shifting security priorities from the US.

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As these Beijing-prompted incidents continue to increase in frequency, they will likely bring renewed global supply chain disruptions. In addition, higher operational costs, hiked insurance rates in light of the growing threats in the region, and the halt in the steady global economic recovery progress made since the COVID-19 pandemic. In concert, a reduced US presence and increasingly aggressive China will heighten the likelihood that regional partners—such as South Korea or Japan— will reduce their reliance on the US and increase their dependence on other players—such as the UK or Australia. This will shift the power balance in favour of China as nation-states such as Australia struggle to fill the power gap left by Washington, endangering freedom of navigation for all companies in the Indo-Pacific region.  

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