The Ukraine Conflict – A Retrospective & Forecast Ahead

• Moscow and Kyiv’s tit-for-tat conflict continued to be a stalemate over the last year. It is unlikely that Ukrainian forces will launch a frontline-changing counteroffensive this year, given their manpower and material capability limitations. In 2024, Ukrainians have assumed a defensive posture along the majority of the frontline while fighting Russian forces trying to create exploitable gaps. However, Russia’s Black Sea Fleet (BSF)has been forced out of Crimea by the Ukrainian navy, specifically their usage of maritime drones and long-range missile targeting of vessels whilst they are in port. Resultantly, the BSF has moved to the ports of Novorossiysk and Feodosia and has been recently spotted near Ochamchire, in the Abkhazia separatist region of Georgia.

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• Nevertheless, this continued stalemate between Kyiv and Moscow has seen an increasing number of Russian sabotage incidents, not only inside Ukraine but inside those EU nations that support Ukraine’s struggle. Several cases of sabotage with likely links to the Russian state have occurred throughout Europe on infrastructure that is critical to Ukraine’s war effort. European critical infrastructure operators – defence, energy, public transport, telecoms, etc. –are the most at risk for these attacks as Russia aims to disrupt critical components of Ukraine’s supply chain and further deter future support for Ukraine from Western countries.

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• It remains incredibly difficult to predict what will happen in Ukraine in the future or when the war will end. Nevertheless, the high intensity of missile and drone threats throughout Ukraine and their effectiveness at destroying critical energy infrastructure will likely result in frequent blackouts and power outages across Ukraine. Moreover, Russia’s transition to a war economy, replacement of Defence and Deputy Defence Ministers with economists and improved relations with North Korea, Iran, and China will improve the efficiency of Moscow’s war efforts in Ukraine and alleviate some supply and troop fatigue concerns due to growing ally support, especially from North Korea. This will allow Russia to sustain the current tempo of operations (land, sea, and air) until at least the end of 2025.

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As we nearly enter the 900^th day after the Russian Federation's invasion of Ukraine on February 24th, 2022, the conflict’s security and political-economic implications have spread to such an extent that it is difficult to identify a country in the world that is not affected by the conflict. Admittedly, some states and industries are being impacted more than others. Therefore, identifying the greatest threats to you is of paramount importance. Currently, neither side is making great gains despite the continued escalation of land, air, naval, and sabotage operations throughout the theatre. Nevertheless,2024 saw several notable developments in the Ukraine conflict, namely:

Ukrainian Forces remain on the Defensive amid sluggish Western aid, while Russian forces make headways in expanding their control of the Donbas Region

Ukrainian forces have generally assumed defensive positions due to the lack of ammunition, while Russian troops have pursued an offensive posture, albeit limited in nature, as they sought to seize upon the opportunity presented by sluggish military aid deliveries by Ukraine’s partners. Despite their defensive posture, Ukrainian troops have proved to be agile when engaging the more fluid Russian onslaughts, proving to be able to adapt and overcome Russian attempts at battle-shaping manoeuvres. Despite such attempts by the Russians, many areas continue to be fixed, hotbeds of fierce fighting, resulting in no significant gains by either side, with two notable exceptions, namely in the area of Chasiv Yar and Avdiivka.

The vicinities of Chasiv Yar and Avdiivka have proven to be areas where Russian forces have made significant progress as a result of their opportunistic assaults. Since their breakthrough in Avdiivka in mid-February, the Russians have strived to achieve a larger encirclement effort that aims to outflank and isolate Ukrainian forces fighting in the vicinity of a key logistical hub of Donetsk oblast, Toretsk. This tactic has been aided by the Russian force’s use of its air superiority. From December 2023 to January 2024, Russian combined air asset attacks along the frontline seemingly identified areas of weakness in the Ukrainian air defence through which missiles and drones could target wider parts of Ukraine behind the frontline and Ukraine’s critical infrastructure.

Russian Disinformation Persists despite Kyiv’s growing Counterintelligence Operations

The Ukrainian Intelligence Service(SBU) regularly posts on its social media pages its counter-intelligence activities to control the narrative of the war and reduce the potential traction gained by Russia in denying such claims. There have been numerous incidents that the SBU has filmed or detailed that convey the degree and extent to which there are Russian-aligned or associated entities actively trying to subvert Ukrainian war efforts. In most incidents, these are individuals who are caught disseminating dis- and misinformation. However, it was observed throughout 2024 that Russian disinformation was increasing about energy infrastructure locations, nuclear power plant security systems’ information, and industrial locations, especially those that were linked or suspected of being linked to the Ukrainian war machine. In these cases, individuals would fly off-the-shelf drones, reconnoitre areas of interest, and relay their findings to their Russian handlers.

The Stabilisation of Russia’s Domestic Politics & Growing Ally Support Will Increase its Combat Success in the Coming Year

Ukraine’s success in the early stages of the conflict can not only be in part attributed to Russia’s underestimation of Kyiv’s defensive capabilities but also the mismanagement of the conflict by domestic military and political leaders in Russia. Russian President Vladimir Putin has dismissed at least eight senior Russian military commanders since the invasion in February 2022, with several not being reposted after their dismissal. This revolving door of commanders allowed Ukrainian forces to recapture a notable amount of territory in the subsequent months following their dismissals.

Despite this, Putin’s widespread restructuring of his military commanders has appeared to recentred Russia’s military strategy and allowed for more effective execution in the last year. Most notably, Russia has improved its domestic industrial base, including its drone production capabilities, in large part due to replacing Defence Minister Shoigu in May with economist Andrei Belousov and similarly replacing the Deputy Defence Minister with Deputy Economic Minister Oleg Savelyev.

However, an unaddressed aspect that has also alleviated many of Moscow’s capacity and production constraints in the last year that limited it in the early stages of the war is the increasing contributions Russia is receiving from allies. Russia has continued to improve relations with North Korea, Iran, and China, who have sent ammunition, drone technology components, and dual-use technologies, respectively, that have complimented Russia's war economy. North Korea, in particular, has provided Russia with a consistent flow of both military and labour-related aid in 2024. According to South Korea’s Defence Minister Shin Wonsik, Pyongyang is projected to have provided up to 4.8 million artillery shells to Russia. This aid has been a significant boon to Russia’s operations in Ukraine, especially as Russian forces have claimed that a “chronic shell famine” has limited the effectiveness of its artillery strikes.

With the aid provided by Russia’s allies set to persist indefinitely and ease supply concerns, there is a heightened risk of the success rate of Russia’s military offensive in the Donbas increase. Ukraine’s critical infrastructure operators – such as energy firms – are the most at risk from this development. Similarly, Western organisations providing support to these Ukrainian entities are also at risk of being targeted by Russian cyberattacks. Moscow-linked actors are known to launch disruptive cyber operations –e.g. Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) or wiper attacks - hours before kinetic attacks against the critical infrastructure to limit Kyiv’s coordination and defensive responsiveness.

Russian Black Sea Fleet’s loses and Regional Players’ Demining Operations Increase the Safety of Black Sea & Danube for Western Businesses

Outside of Ukraine, the conflict continues to simmer in the Black Sea and the Danube as well. The security environment in the Black Sea and the Danube has also evolved since the outbreak of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Most noticeably through the effective deployment of Ukrainian sea drones. These drones have pushed the Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) out of its previous ports in Crimea to others further afield in the eastern Black Sea and Ochamchire, in the Abkhazia separatist region of Georgia. In March, the Ukrainian military claimed that one-third of the BSF had been destroyed or disabled, with most vessels porting in Sevastopol. Moreover, what compounds the problems facing the diminished capacity of the BSF is that due to Türkiye's stewardship of the Straits and upholding the Montreux Convention, Russian Naval ships could not enter the Black Sea and replace the damaged ships during wartime.  

Meanwhile, the security situation in the Black Sea has also changed for non-belligerents of this war, namely seafarers operating in the western Black Sea and the Danube. This risk was assessed to be high since February 2022. This was due to the continued mining of the northeastern part of the Black Sea by the Russian military and the frequency with which sea mine incidents were taking place in the western parts of the sea caused by the general westerly currents of the sea. However, a historic moment took place on July 1^st, 2024, when the Mine Countermeasures Naval Group in the Black Sea (MCM BS) - comprising Türkiye, Bulgaria, and Romania - began demining operations in the western Black Sea to improve the security of seafarers in their territorial waters. While these operations are in the early days, such efforts are likely to significantly lower the risk presented to Western shipping companies sailing through the Western Black Sea. Furthermore, they will allow for some regular economic activities to return in the coming months, especially for commercial shipping or maritime vessel builders based in Romania, Türkiye, or Bulgaria.

The war has also given rise to other types of security risks outside of the conventional ones associated with kinetic warfare. The increased threats posed to organisations and individuals in Ukraine and Europe are as follows:  

Russian Sabotage Operations will present long-term threats to Europe-based Businesses

Meanwhile, increasing incidents of sabotage have been seen since 2014, not only inside Ukraine but inside those EU nations that support Ukraine’s struggle. Several cases of sabotage with likely links to the Russian state have occurred throughout Europe on infrastructure that is critical to Ukraine’s war effort. Notable cases of such activity include arson and vandalism of exchange points along French and German railway networks, a case of arson at a Ukraine aid warehouse in the UK, several railway derailments in Sweden, sabotage attack plans on German military bases in Bavaria, and the vandalism of the cars of Estonia’s Interior Minister and a pro-Ukrainian journalist.

This threat posed by Russian-associated actors has been highlighted by several Western intelligence chiefs who have publicly warned against the heightened threat of sabotage and espionage from Russia. The threat posed by these acts of sabotage is highly likely to continue in the coming year. This is especially true given that the Western aid to Kyiv is likely to even the battlefield in Ukraine’s favour and lower Russia’s ongoing military successes. European defence firms are likely to be the most at risk of being targeted by such operations. However, European critical infrastructure operators – energy, public transport, telecoms, etc. – are also at heightened risk as these attacks are typically aimed at disrupting critical components of Western society as a form of political retaliation.

It is incredibly difficult to give forecasts as to what will happen in Ukraine in the future or when the war will end. However, having monitored this conflict intensely for several years, Proximities can offer some analysis-based estimations.

Firstly, it is unlikely that Ukrainian forces will conduct a frontline-changing counter-offensive in 2024. This assessment is based on the fact that Ukraine is fighting effectively along the frontline from defensive positions assumed earlier in 2024. The long-awaited US military aid appeared to have made its way to the frontlines following the April 20^th military aid bill being passed in US Congress as Lieutenant-General Havryliuk remarked on June 11^th that the artillery disparity had reduced from 7-to-1 to 5-to-1 along the northern front, namely Kharkiv region. Therefore, Ukrainians are, at the moment, outgunned, but it must be emphasised that fresh troops and new material, including the long-awaited F-16 fighter jets, are continually increasing in number and reinforcing the frontline. Therefore, it is likely that Ukraine will continue to regroup, consolidate, and reorganise their forces from fortified positions whilst the capability disparity is reducing day by day and its ability to conduct combined arms assaults is increased through training.

Secondly, given the sustained high intensity of missile and drone threats throughout Ukraine and their effectiveness at destroying critical energy infrastructure, the coming winter for Ukraine will be difficult and very likely characterised by frequent blackouts and power outages. Moreover, the lack of sophisticated, effective air defence systems throughout Ukraine, especially in urban areas, will mean that critical infrastructure is extremely vulnerable to air strikes, prolonging the energy crisis aspect of this war. To offset this potential, emphasis is already beginning to be placed on fuel imports for individual businesses and citizenships as they seek to secure fuel for their generators. The resumption of targeting Danube port infrastructure, which is vital to fuel imports, will only exacerbate this situation.

Thirdly, as Russia has implemented a war economy, appointed economists as the Defence and Deputy Defence Minister, and filled previous capability gaps by increasing its cooperation with North Korea, Iran, and China, Russia is likely able to sustain the current tempo of operations (land, sea, and air) until at least the end of 2025. However, on March 7^th, the Lithuanian intelligence service provided its annual threat assessment, according to which they assess that the Russian military will be able to continue their war efforts at a similar intensity level for at least two more years. A noteworthy point is that there are increasing reports as of June 2024 that there are now increased incentives being advertised in Russia for men to fight in Ukraine in return for significantly higher pay rewards than previously offered, signalling that Russia may be experiencing the start of a manpower shortage. Russian allies such as North Korea have promised to provide both military support – troops – and operational support – rebuilding the Donbas– which will further alleviate any Russian troop fatigue.

Similarly, the EU and many European nations took steps to provide long-term support to Ukraine in the form of long-term bilateral agreements, many lasting until 2027 and 2030. May 22nd saw the EU take a decisive step by officially approving a plan to use windfall profits from Russian central bank assets currently frozen in the EU to bolster Ukraine's defences.

Finally, the security of military assets bound for Ukraine will become increasingly vulnerable to traditional sabotage throughout the following 12 months, not least locations associated with the F-16s that Ukraine will be flying in theatre. It is understood that many aircraft, if not sorties, will be flown out of Romania, specifically the Mihail Kogălniceanu Air Base, due to the requirement to have a safe base at which the aircraft can be maintained. These safe bases will be at a heightened risk of being targeted by Russian sabotage operations.

What Now?

Proximities can help you gain key insights and turn them into tangible material. Using our ‘What?’, ‘So What?’, ‘What If?’, and ‘What Now?’ narratives, we help partners and clients not only understand the importance of trends and events but, more specifically, to understand what it means for you and your business from a strategic to operational perspective. If you want to learn more about how Proximities can help you mitigate these risks, do not hesitate to contact us.

If you’d like to learn more about how Proximities has dealt with the Ukraine conflict in the past, please check out the impact study on how we aided one of our clients in evacuating their personnel from a conflict hot zone in Ukraine.

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